1922 in Germany

From open-encyclopedia.com - the free encyclopedia.

See also: 1921 in Germany, other events of 1922, 1923 in Germany and the Timeline of German history.

During 1922, the problem of reparations dominated Germany's public life even more than it had the preceding year. Issues of disarmament and the trial of war criminals had previously been similar sources of anxiety and unrest, but now receded into the background. Although these social questions remained in the public consciousness, Germans focused most heavily on the economics of how Germany would meet the reparation obligations stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles.

Reparation Worries

Though reparations had been reduced to definite figures in the London ultimatum of May 5, 1921, economic concerns had reached a critical stage at the beginning of the year. As a practical precaution, Germany requested postponement of its reparation payments. After the change of the ministry in France on January 12, the request provoked a battle. The moratorium was denied, spelling the collapse of the exchange. The year closed amid a general feeling of hopelessness.

The financial stability of the country and its currency rapidly deteriorated during 1921 after the first reparation payments were made. The government asked the Bank of England for a loan of £25 million, but the governor replied that no credit could be given because of Germany's crushing load of reparations debt. Accordingly, the government's last step of 1921 was to turn to the Reparations Commission with a declaration that Germany would be able to pay only a part of the next two reparation installments due on January 15 and February 15, and requested they be allowed to postpone payment. This move forced the Supreme Council of the Allies to seek a new solution to the reparations problem.

The Supreme Council in Cannes

When the French premier Aristide Briand convened the conference of the Supreme Council at Cannes, the first subject discussed was reparations. But no decision on a moratorium was reached. Walther Rathenau, the head of the German delegation, set forth the extent of Germany's capacity to pay. Unfortunately, the conference was broken off prematurely because a cabinet crisis supervened in France -- the new head of affairs, Raymond Poincaré, was not open to discussions.

Still, on January 13, immediately before conference dissolved, the Reparations Commission granted Germany a temporary postponement, providing it paid 31 million gold marks every ten days and within 14 days submitted a complete plan for amending the German budget, guaranteeing paper currency and developing a scheme for cash payments during 1922.

The German government replied on January 28 by proposing to pay 720 million gold marks in cash and 1.45 billion in kind during 1922. They also asked that cash payments be reduced to the lowest figure possible. To fulfill the rest of the bargain, Germany pointed to an agreement recently reached with the People's Party that would allow them to better collect taxes and introduce new taxes, which were expected to increase revenues significantly.

A bill was noticed intended to secure the Reichsbank in accordance with the commission. It would give complete freedom from interference for the Reich chancellor and a promise that everything that could reasonably be done to lessen debt would occur. The chancellor explained the government's attitude on the reparations question in a speech in the Reichstag on January 28, in which he repudiated Poincaré's French chamber speech charge that Germany maliciously avoided the fulfilment of her obligations. Communists tried to force a censure vote but the Reichstag rejected the gambit.

Revisions and Requests

On March 21, the Reparations Commission answered by fixing the obligations of Germany at the figures proposed by the German government, but with certain conditions which would have to be carried out by May 31, including requiring a new taxation scheme of 60 billion marks. A number of measures for securing strict control over German finances and the German budget were required to be introduced at early dates, and the scheme for an internal loan submitted by April 30.

By 248 votes to 81, with 43 abstentions, the Reichstag on March 30 passed a resolution protesting the new regulations, which many believed would cause the rapid depreciation of German money.

The government asked the Reparations Commission to reconsider its decision of March 21, and proposed that experts investigate Germany's capacity to pay. The Reparations Commission temporarily ended the discussion with an answer deploring Germany's obstinacy and warning the government of possible consequences, but at the same time expressing readiness to examine every practical suggestion which might be put forward.

The World Economic Congressional Meeting in Genoa

Meanwhile, the great World Economic Congress met in Genoa -- the one positive result of the Cannes conference. The congress lost much of its significance for Germany as France had consented to take part in it only on condition that reparations were not officially raised. Nevertheless, the German government regarded the congress as a moral victory. Yet very little actual progress was made.

The German delegation became the object of unwelcome attention when it concluded a political and economic agreement with the Russian foreign minister Georgi Chicherin in Rapallo on Easter Sunday (April 16). The agreement had been drawn up in Berlin, but laid aside before being finally adopted. This agreement finally established peace between the two countries, waived all claims arising from the war on both sides and restored diplomatic relations. Thus, the Bolshevic government was accorded open recognition. The former Russian ambassador's palace in Berlin, after being empty for years, had already been handed over. This step added some difficulty to the negotiations of the Great Powers with the Moscow government, which was already obstinate enough.

German delegates' assurances that no disloyalty had been intended by these agreements were rejected with scorn. German delegates futilely asserted that they had reliable information that the other powers were about to conclude arrangements with Russia which would put Germany in a tight corner if she did not act quickly. The French delegation showed itself particularly indignant, as did the British.

The affair concluded with the delegation being prohibited from participating in the commission for Russian affairs. The representatives of the Great and Little Ententes had the last word with the assertion that the German statements had not "a shadow of justification." In French quarters, it was alleged that the agreement obtained the right of manufacturing war material in Russia. This crisis was followed by others. The German delegates again did good service by settling these crises. On the whole, however, the only economic questions decided by the congress were of secondary importance.

Negotiating an International Loan

Of more consequence to Germany was the approach of May 31, with the threat of dire consequences if the obligations fixed by the Reparations Commission were not carried out. Poincaré had already set forth the programme of pledges and sanctions with which he meant to overcome the alleged "bad will" of Germany. Accordingly, the financial minister, Dr. Hermes, went to Paris. As a result of his discussions with the Reparations Commission, the government was able to make a proposal that was accepted. The government promised to balance the budget and undertook to keep the floating debt at the figure of March 31 (272 billion marks), and to counterbalance any increases by increases of revenue, on condition that an international loan would be arranged "in due time." The Reparations Commission consented to a postpone payment for 1922, but with the proviso that the moratorium would be annulled if Germany failed to carry out its obligations, or if it should be found impossible to keep the floating debt down to the stipulated level.

A special Loan Committee met in Paris, to examine the conditions under which it would be possible to raise an international loan like the one that had been declared necessary. The committee was composed of authorities in the financial world, such as Pierpont Morgan and Benjamin Strong, director of the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. The committee got as far as asking the Reparations Commission the question: "Is Germany bound to pay the instalments fixed on May 5, 1921, in London?" All the members of the Commission, with the exception of the French, were prepared to answer that the committee was empowered to investigate all the conditions requisite for securing an international loan without regard to the London ultimatum. But the French premier stated in the Chamber that, as head of the government, he had informed the Reparations Commission that the question of an international loan was not to be made dependent on any modification of the French demands. Owing to this, and the fact that France was the power most concerned, the Loan Committee adjourned indefinitely, but expressed its readiness, if invited, to meet again, should conditions become more favourable.

Assassination and Instability

Then followed the most terrible event of the year - an event which put the stability of the German Republic to a severe test. On the morning of June 24, Walter Rathenau was shot dead by assassins in front of his house. Walther Rathenau was the minister for foreign affairs, and his abilities and knowledge of affairs were a valuable asset and source of hope to Germany in this critical time. The immature, excited Nationalist assassins, saw him only as the hated Jew. The world wide horror evoked by this shocking crime could not fail to shake confidence in the future of the country. Four days before the assassination, the mark was still at one sixty-seventh of its par value. On June 27, just one week later, it had sunk to one-eightieth of par, on July 3 to one hundred-and-fourteenth, and on August 1 to one hundred-and-fiftieth.

Owing to this new development, the German government on July 12 made a fresh application for postponement of the payments that had been fixed for 1922, and for a simultaneous reduction of the monthly payments for the clearing of private prewar claims from £2,000,000 to £500,000. The Reparations Commission promised to reply, if possible, by August 15. But France returned an abrupt negative to the request for a reduction of the clearing payments, and even threatened reprisals if Germany did not carry out its clearing obligations by August 5. These reprisals consisted of: the expulsion of 500 Germans from Alsace-Lorraine, the confiscation of the income and property of German companies in Alsace, and the complete suspension of the clearing system. They were actually commenced by the French government, but soon countermanded on sharp protests by the population of the whole district, especially the business community. Negotiations thereupon were instituted, in which an agreement was reached with regard to the clearing system.

On August 7, a conference of the Allied governments met in London to deal with the main question - the request for a moratorium for 1922. The deliberations were again fruitless. Before he would grant a moratorium, Poincaré demanded "productive pledges": the confiscation of forests and mines, and participation in the German dye industry in the occupied district. The representatives of the other governments were willing to grant only the control of such pledges, but not their confiscation. The request was accordingly referred to the Reparations Commission, which opened new negotiations with the government in Berlin for the voluntary surrender of suitable pledges. Owing to the persistent refusal of Germany, these negotiations led to no result. In order to avoid an impasse, the Commission accepted a compromise which had been proposed by the representative of Belgium, the power which stood to gain most by it. In the comprimise, Germany would issue treasury bonds of six months' currency for the rest of its payments due in 1922. The decision in this case was unanimous, where the German request for a moratorium had been rejected only by a majority, according to a preconcerted agreement. The German-Belgian negotiations regarding the period and guaranteeing of the treasury bonds led, with the assistance of the Bank of England and the German Reichsbank, to a result satisfactory to both sides. Germany was thus released from further cash payments for 1922.

Inflation and Repercussions

The Belgian arrangement virtually secured Germany a moratorium for 1922, but the fundamental question was not settled. The main cause of Germany's inability to pay, the steady depreciation of the mark, was ongoing. Towards the end of the year it assumed a disastrous rapidity. On August 1, the dollar still stood at M. 643 and the pound at M. 2,850. But on September 5 the dollar had already risen to M. 1,440 and the pound to M. 6,525, and in December the pound was worth between 30,000 and 40,000 marks and the dollar between 7,000 and 9,000. The German currency had already fallen to one forty-fifth part of its par value at the beginning of the year. Towards the end of the year, it was at times worth only one two-thousandth part, and only for brief intervals rose to one sixteen-hundredth part of its previous value.

In such circumstances it was impossible to exercise proper supervision over the national finances. The budget submitted at the beginning of the year had provided for an ordinary revenue and expenditure of 103,208,000,000 marks. The expenditure included, in addition to the costs of the administration, 16,500,000,000 for reparations. The extraordinary budget balanced at 4,945 million marks, of which 3,100,000,000 were for loans for productive objects. The state services (posts, railways, and printing press) required in the ordinary budget no supplementary estimates, but the railways claimed 6,800,000,000 for new capital and the posts 2,100,000,000, so that the loans for productive objects would have totalled about 12,000,000,000. With the mark at one forty-fifth of its par value, the cost of carrying out the terms of the peace treaty was now 187,531,000,000 marks. Of this sum 16,500,000,000 were provided by the ordinary budget; the other 171,000,000,000 would have had to be raised by a loan. As soon as the mark fell to a sixtieth of par the deficit became 210,000,000,000 instead of 171,000,000,000; and it swelled to fantastic dimensions with the further depreciation of the mark which actually followed. The floating debt had risen from 247,000,000,000 at the beginning of the year to 272,000,000,000 by March 31, then to 962,000,000,000 and to 1,494,000,000,000 by the end of the year.

The depreciation of the currency that had caused such confusion in the public finances, also led to a nervous and often arbitrary raising of prices. Salaries and wages were quite unable to keep pace with the increase, and large sections of the population were rendered destitute. Stabilizing of the mark became the utmost necessity for both the external and the internal situation. The government sought to prevent the further fall of the mark by a regulation forbidding dealing in foreign currencies. The measure, however, was not well conceived and proved wholly ineffective; it met with sharp opposition, and soon had to be altered. A project for a gold reserve loan was seriously mooted for a time, but was dropped owing to party differences.

Loan Renegotiation

At the beginning of November the Reparations Commission went to Berlin in the hope of there finding a way out of the impasse. At the same time, a conference was held in Berlin of economic and financial authorities who had been asked to give reasoned opinions on the possibility of stabilizing the mark. Both conferences ended without positive result. The Reparations Commission failed to find the concrete proposals that it had looked for in the note of the German government, which it took with it to Paris as the result of the conference. The answers of the experts, who in substance had declared the stabilization of the mark to be feasible, did not grant the cooperation of the Reichsbank, help from abroad, reduction of the burden of reparations, or any action of the government in the direction indicated.

The causes of this inactivity were partly in the personality of the members of the government, partly in obstacles from without. A large cause was reluctance of the Reichsbank to risk a part of its gold reserve in an attempt to reform the currency. Speaking for a section of the industrial world, Hugo Stinnes expressed in the Central Economic Council his approval in principle of the attempt to stabilize the mark, but considered that financial measures to this purpose were less important than increasing production by lengthening working hours.

On November 13, the Wirth government made definite proposals regarding stabilization and reparations in a note to the Reparations Commission. These proposals were: to fix the German reparation obligations definitely at a tolerable figure, to release Germany for three to four years from all payments in cash and kind, to summon an immediate conference of international financiers to consider the granting of a bank credit to Germany, and, finally, to support Germany's demand for complete equality of treatment in trade and commerce.

Domestic Political Change

Immediately after the despatch of this note, the Wirth cabinet found itself compelled to resign owing to party dissensions. In order to secure a broader basis for his government in the critical situation which faced the republic, Dr. Wirth had sought to gain the adherence of the German People's Party, which represented the property-owning classes. Previously, the moderate socialist party had reunited with the Independent Social Democrats who had seceded during the war, while as a kind of counterpoise the bourgeois parties in the government coalition had formed a "working agreement" in Parliament with the German People's Party. The united Social Democrats objected to the entry of the German People's Party into the government coalition. Having made this a question of confidence, Dr. Wirth felt himself compelled to resign.

The president entrusted the formation of a new cabinet to Dr. Wilhelm Cuno, manager of the Hamburg-America Line, who accomplished the task with some difficulty. As the Social Democrats refused to join, Dr. Cuno formed a so-called business ministry, which, however, was largely composed of deputies of the bourgeois coalition. These parties did not form a majority in the House by themselves. Consequently, the cabinet depended on the good will either of the Social Democrats or the German Nationalists. The offices were filled as follows: chancellor, Dr. Cuno (no party); vice-chancellor and minister of justice, Dr. Rudolf Heinze (German People's Party); finance, Dr. Andreas Hermes (Centre); labour, Dr. Heinrich Brauns (Centre); Board of Trade, Dr. Johannes Becker (German People's Party); defense, Dr. Otto Gessler (Democrat); communications, Wilhelm Groener; posts, Karl Stingl (formerly state secretary in the Reich ministry of posts); ministry of the interior, Rudolf Oeser (Democrat); treasury, Heinrich Albert (formerly secretary of the Reich Exchequer); food, Dr. Hans Luther (formerly mayor of Essen); foreign affairs, Frederic Hans von Rosenberg (formerly ambassador in Copenhagen).

The new government continued the reparations policy of its predecessor, taking its stand unreservedly on the latter's note concerning stabilization and reparations which had been approved of by the vast majority of the Reichstag. When a conference of the Allies met in London to consider the German request for a postponement of payment, the new government made fresh proposals on matters of detail regarding the periods and the application of the loans it had in view. The conference rejected the proposals as inadequate. The London negotiations brought no solution of the reparations question. Poincaré's plans for the seizing of "productive pledges" and the occupation of the Ruhr valley met with the opposition of the other powers, while Poincaré on his side was not to be moved from his designs, which were of a military and political rather than economic character, by any offers of England for a mutual cancellation of debts. Thus the year ended with a situation full of ominous uncertainty.

Occupation of the Rhineland and Escalating conflict

In the occupied Rhineland and the rest of Germany, the "pledge" policy had wounded national susceptibilities most acutely. Many people saw the policy as a plan for the piecemeal detachment of the Rhineland from the mother country, after the manner of Louis XIV. The press both in England and in Germany had divulged the contents of a secret memorandum drawn up by Adrien Dariac, president of the Financial Commission of the French Chamber.

Dariac's memo demanded that the programme of French policy in the Rhineland include:

• the prolongation of the period of military occupation,
• the removal of Prussian officials,
• a customs barrier between occupied and unoccupied Germany,
• a separate Rhineland budget,
• a separate Rhineland militia,
• extension of the powers of the Inter-Allied Commission, and
• the election of an assembly to meet this commission.

The official policy of pledges and sanctions seemed to the Rhinelanders to bear a fatal likeness to this programme. The administration of the Rhineland Commission in the occupied district was dominated by French ideas, and was not calculated to win adherents for this policy. Only a small group of protégés of the Rhineland Commission openly advocated dismemberment. In the last months of the year, sharp protests against dismemberment arose from the political parties, municipalities, middle class and Socialist organizations, and the clergy of the great religious bodies.

A feeling of historically unmatched bitterness arose the occupation of the Rhineland occupation, as the French took the following steps:

• Expelling private individuals and officials;
• Protesting against the appointment of officials from unoccupied districts;
• Interfering with the curricula of Rhenish schools;
• Deposing and expelling high officials, like the Wiesbaden Regierungspräsident Momm;
• Arresting the Regierungsassessor Dr. Prange in Wiesbaden and sentencing him by court-martial to five years' imprisonment;
• prohibiting German courts from carrying out the sentence of imprisonment passed on Joseph Smeets, the separatist and French protégé;
• Prohibiting the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the German Empire;
• Prohibiting the German national hymn,
• Restricting speech and writing

The situation was such that the German public, in its own helplessness, looked at the presence of English and American troops as a kind of protection. When America, which had withdrawn part of its garrison in the summer, announced its intention of withdrawing the rest, the Germans regarded the reduction of occupying soldiers an actual misfortune. Numerous unpleasantness with coloured and white troops served to accentuate this feeling of unjust treatment. Certain affairs with Belgian detachments in Hamborn and Oberkassel left behind particularly disagreeable recollections.

Additionally, the occupation and the officials connected with it consumed sums of money which seemed wantonly extravagant in comparison of the small incomes of the German officials, employees, and workmen. The payments made by Germany in cash and kind up to March were estimated by the Reparations Commission at 11,400,000 million gold marks. According to the same reckoning, 2,860,000 million (or 2.26 trillion) gold marks of this sum were left for reparations, while 4,420,000 million (or 4.42 trillian) gold marks were spent on the occupation. The control commissions aroused similar feelings. They were still at work in the unoccupied territory, and had not yet been abolished, as the commission for aircraft was after Germany had delivered up or destroyed all the air material left from the war.

The process of disarmament continued more or less smoothly during the year. The fortresses on the West front ceased to exist, as did those of Friedrichsort, Kiel, and Heligoland. Gessler, the minister of defense, characterized the assertion that Germany was preparing a new war of revenge in the dark after the style of Scharnhorst as a senseless fabrication. The few complaints which were made were attended to through the usual channels, without creating any stir. The visits of Allied officers provoked the rougher elements of the population to an exhibition of violence in a few towns, specificially, Stettin, Passau, and Ingolstadt. The Allies made each exhibition into an occasion for demands of special reparation and apologies, which had to be complied with by the government, although in the German view no blame attached to any officials.

Treaties and the Creation of Poland

A number of treaties were concluded with various states - with Switzerland, the United States, Italy, Latvia, and Finland. Most were economic in character, and served to clear away the debris left by the war. The extension of the Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo to the Soviet republics federated with Russia - the Ukraine, White Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Republic of the Far East - took place as a matter of course, and aroused no attention.

Poland and Germany made good progress towards coming to terms on the question of Upper Silesia. Through the mediation of the Swiss deputy Felix Calonder, the two countries came to an agreement in April. The agreement was designed to last fifteen years, which gave prospect of a lasting settlement. The most difficult questions were those of the protection of minorities, and of German private property liquidation in the portions of Upper Silesia assigned to Poland. Difficulties arose when Poland claimed an unrestricted right of liquidation, and failed to recognize the right of the chairman of the Mixed Commission to arbitrate. A compromise was reached, in which Poland gained a limited right of liquidation, without inflicting too great a hardship on the German owners.

On July 17, the transfer to Poland of the parts of Upper Silesia assigned to her commenced. At the same time, large portions of the population moved from newly-Polish districts into the parts that remained German. A few weeks later, the German districts voted on whether they should become an autonomous federated state, or remain incorporated with Prussia. The result was: 513,126 votes for Prussia, 50,400 for autonomy. It was now possible to hold the elections to the Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag which had been postponed on account of the occupation. They ended unfavourably for the Poles, who won no seat out of five in the Reichstag, and one out of eight in the Landtag.

Great dissatisfaction arose in Germany in response to the fate of five villages on the east bank of the Vistula. These villages had formerly belonged to West Prussia, were inhabited almost entirely by Germans, and had voted for assignment Germany. The boundar commission nevertheless assigned them to Poland, in spite of protests by the inhabitants, the Reichstag, and the Prussian Landtag. The Prussian premier Otto Braun emphatically stigmatized this decision as a "scandalous breach of the peace of Versailles". The protest was so effective that the execution of the decision was postponed and had not yet been carried out at the end of the year.

Internal Unrest

The interal position of the republic was somewhat weakened by unrest arising from economic fragility. This fragility resulted from uncertainty concerning the war debts and the despair to which large sections of the population were being reduced by economic straits. Communist agitation had little success, however. In February, a strike engineered by the more reckless elements among the railway employees paralyzed traffic for six days in North Germany and a part of Baden. It then collapsed, and was followed by disciplinary action against some of the instigators and also those participators in the strike who had been guilty of acts of violence and sabotage. The government, supported by public opinion, held that state employees had no right to strike, and received a vote of confidence on this point in the Reichstag. A frivolous strike of the Berlin municipal workers, which left the capital without light, water, and electricity, ended after three days with an unconditional resumption of work. Food disturbances broke out at some places in the summer, but they were easily suppressed.

More disturbing to the peace of the republic were the subterraneous movements which were fomented in anti-republican circles, and commanded the services of numerous existing organizations, some secret, others public. The preceding year had been marked by the murder of Matthias Erzberger. This year was marked by the aforementioned murder of Walther Rathenau, an attempt to poison Philipp Scheidemann, the lord mayor of Kassel, with prussic acid on Whit Monday, and the stabbing of Maximilian Harden on July 3. The public was very shocked by these crimes. The feeling aroused found vent in great demonstrations on the part of the republican section of the population, especially among the working classes. In certain places, e.g., Zwickau, near Magdeburg, Freiburg, Darmstadt, etc., violent exhibitions of popular resentment erupted, at times accompanied by bloodshed.

Political Repercussions

The republican authorities acted with great energy, and proclaimed relentless warfare against the "Right". These actions provoked the taunt from political opponents that the authorities were misusing the resources of the state for party purposes. An order was issued investing the government with extraordinary powers to cope with the emergency. A few days later it was withdrawn in favour of a bill "for the protection of the republic", increasing the penalties for attacks on republican institutions and officials, establishing a special State Court within the Reich Court, and laying down regulations for the strict control of societies, meetings, and printed matter. This was followed by an amnesty bill, a crimes bill, and a supplement to the officials law. The Reichstag passed the bill for the protection of the republic after a long discussion by 303 votes to 102. The other bills were also passed by large majorities. Only the German Nationalists, the Bavarian People's Party, the Communists, and certain members of the German People's Party voted against them.

Since the overthrow of its soviet republic, Bavarian administration and legislation had been pervaded by a spirit of indifference both to the republican constitution and the unity of the Reich. In the previous year, Bavaria cameinto conflict with the Reich government over the question of the disbandment of the militia. Unsurprisingly, Bavaria announced its opposition to the bill in the Reichsrat from the very first. The Bavarian Landtag characterized it as a piece of arbitrary legislation, an offense against democracy, and an infringement of Bavarian sovereignty.

Acting on its rights under the Reich constitution and in accordance with the sentiment of the majority of the Landtag, the Bavarian government issued an "emergency order" which reproduced the bill with omissions. The Reich government and the Reichstag did not remain passive under this defiance of the authority of the Reich, and demanded the promulgation of the bill without alteration. Negotiations were opened. In northern Bavaria, the majority of the population took up the Reich standpoint. A compromise finally reached through the intervention of the president of the Reich. In the comprrmise, Bavaria did indeed promulgate the Reich law, but as a concession to its particularism a special South German department of the new court was established. The Bavarian premier, Count Hugo von Lerchenfeld had adopted a somewhat wavering attitude in this conflict between the Reich and Bavaria. He retired a few weeks after the bill's promulgation, as he had lost the confidence of the strongly particularist Bavarian People's Party, which had the majority in Bavaria. He was succeeded by the minister of education, Eugen von Knilling.

Trials

In response to the Law for the Protection of the Republic, a number of "right revolutionary" organizations, which were known to be nurseries of anti-republican sentiment, were dissolved. Unfortunately, the expectation that the trials instituted on account of the above-mentioned crimes would afford a clue to the original instigators of these crimes was not fulfilled. In the trial of ex-Captain Manfred von Killinger in May for abetting the murder of Erzberger it became apparent that there must have been parties behind the scenes, but the identities of the parties remained unknown, and the accused was acquitted, although his connection with the murderers of Erzberger was not in doubt. The actual murderers of Rathenau, the engineer Hermann Fischer and Naval Lieutenant (retired) Erwin Kern, had escaped arrest and condemnation by suicide. A number of persons who were accused partly of complicity, partly of abetting or assisting, were brought before the new court in October. Ernst Techow, a student, and twenty-one years of age, had driven the motor car in which the actual murderers of Rathenau had been sitting. He was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment and loss of his civic rights. The rest of the accused received lighter sentences, or were acquitted.

A political trial held at Munich was of quite a different character. The author Freiherr Hubert von Leoprechting was on trial for high treason. This man had been in the pay of Dard, the French envoy in Munich, who left the city for good a few days before the trial. It came out in the trial that Dard had acquainted the accused with the plans for separating South from North Germany, and that these plans were, if necessary, to be assisted by an advance of French troops through the Main valley. Furthermore, Leoprechting, who belonged to several Nationalist anti-republican organizations, had pretended to the Reich government to be perfectly loyal to the Empire, and had been receiving large sums of money for acting as a French agent. He was condemned to imprisonment for life and loss of civil rights.

Wolfgang Kapp, the instigator of the notorious Kapp Putsch of March 1920, voluntarily offered in the summer to stand his trial before the Reich Court. He was suffering, however, from an affection of the eyes which necessitated an operation, and as a result of this he died before his trial opened.

The anniversary of the Reich

The anniversary of the establishment of the republic was celebrated throughout the Reich on August 11. On various occasions, the president of the republic, Friedrich Ebert, had asked that, now that Upper Silesia was restored to Germany, an election of a president by the people should take place, as laid down in the constitution. He repeated the request in the autumn. In order, however, to avoid disturbances in the country, the majority parties came to an agreement to amend the constitution in such a way as to allow the present president to remain in office till June 30, 1925. The German Nationalists and Communists objected, but were outvoted by 314 votes to 76. Ebert declared himself satisfied with this arrangement.

No great political changes occurred outside of Bavaria, although elections have taken place in several of the states. The unity of the republic was not threatened. Certain movements for autonomy, the most noticeable of which were in Hannover and the importance of which could not yet be gauged, were directed not against the Reich, but against the Prussian administration. Complaints were made by Heligoland with a somewhat similar object, and were met by Prussia's conceding a certain measure of autonomy to Heligoland within Prussia, so that the island was really administered by its inhabitants.

The Saar District

A few words must be said on the Saar district, which was separated from Germany and placed under a commission representing various governments under the control of the League of Nations, but which by state and international law belonged to Germany.

The population was highly dissatisfied with the rule of the commission. It addressed one complaint after another to the League of Nations, and this body sent a deputation to the district; but the deputation heard only the version of the commission officials, not the population, and the discontent was not allayed. The inhabitants sent a deputation to Geneva to lay their complaints before the League of Nations, and these were reinforced in May by a long memorandum.

Citizens' complaints addressed:

• the despotic character of the whole system,
• frequent expulsions of marked individuals,
• the system of espionage in vogue,
• the preference of French newcomers over natives,
• the illegal presence of 7,500 French troops,
• the purely advisory character of the local parliament,
• French instruction in the elementary schools, and,
• bare-faced attempts made to misrepresent the purely German character of the Saar district.

The German government also protested against the presence of the French garrison. The policy of the commission was the one proposed by the British government, the only member who enjoyed any confidence in the country, Richard Deans Waugh, formerly mayor of Winnipeg in Canada. The flood of complaints, however, did not influence the system of government.

In the district of Memel an unofficial vote was taken. In the population of 140,000, no less than 54,429, or 90% of those entitled to vote, declared themselves in favour of a Free State, there being no prospect of reannexation to Germany.