The End of History and the Last Man
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The End of History and the Last Man is a 1992 book by Francis Fukuyama, expanding on his 1989 essay "The End of History?", in which he argues the controversial thesis that the end of the Cold War signals the end of the progression of human history:
- "What we may be witnessing in not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." (quoted from "The End of History?", 1989)
This thesis conflicts most particularly with Karl Marx's philosophy of history: dialectical materialism. His version of the "end of history" is a time when class distinctions no longer exist, believing them to be the cause of the evolution of "all hitherto existing society." He called this state of classlessness inevitable (though he did not venture to guess how long it would take for it to come about), and named it communism. Fukuyama's thesis, coming at the end of the Cold War, is an obvious reference to Marx's historical dialectic. However, Fukuyama reverts back to the work of Marx's original source, Hegel (especially Hegel as seen by the French thinker Alexandre Kojčve). Fukuyama seems to have been pointed in Kojčve's direction by the prominent neoconservative political philosopher Leo Strauss, who is also influential on Fukuyama's philosophy.
Fukuyama's thesis consists of two main elements.
1: Firstly there is an empirical argument. Fukuyma points out that since the beginning of the Nineteenth Century democracy, which started off as being merely one amongst many systems of government, has grown until nowadays the majority of governments in the world are termed 'democratic'. He also points out that democracy's main intellectual alternatives (communism and fascism) have become discredited.
2: Secondly, there is also a philosophical argument, taken from Hegel. Very briefly, Fukuyama sees history as consisting of the dialectic between two classes: the Master and the Slave. Ultimately, this thesis (Master) and antithesis (Slave) must meet in a synthesis, in which both manage to live in peace together. This can only happen in a democracy.
Fukuyama's thesis is generally misinterpreted and misunderstood. For example, it is frequently claimed that Fukuyama believes that history ended in 1989 (with the fall of the Berlin Wall). In fact, following Hegel, Fukuyama believes that history ended in 1789, with the French Revolution, as this marked the beginnings of parliamentary democracy. All that has happened since then is that it has become more and more obvious that parliamentary democracy is a fundamentally better system (ethically, politically, economically) than any of the alternatives. It must be stressed that the most basic (and prevalent) error in discussing Fukuyama's work is to confuse 'history' with 'events'. Fukuyama does not claim at any point that events will stop happening in the future. What he is claiming is that all that will happen in the future (even if totalitarianism returns, even if fundamentalist Islam becomes a major political force) is that democracy will become more and more prevalent in the long term, although it may have 'temporary' setbacks (which may, of course, last for centuries).
There have been, needless to say, many criticisms of the 'End of History' thesis. Some of these include:
1: Islamic Fundamentalism. Some critics state that Islamic Fundamentalism (as represented by Osama Bin Laden for example) stands in the same relation to 21st century democracy as communism and fascism did in the 20th century i.e. as a fundamental intellectual alternative. Fukuyama discusses this briefly in The End of History. He argues that Islam is not an Imperialist force like communism and fascism: i.e. that it has little intellectual or emotional appeal outside the Islamic 'heartlands'. Moreover, when Islamic states have actually been created (for example Afghanistan), they were easily defeated militarily by the capitalist democracies. Fukuyama points to the economic and political difficulties that Iran and Saudi Arabia are facing, and argues that such states are fundamentally unstable: either they will become Islamic democracies (like Turkey) or they will simply disintegrate.
2. Marxism of course, is another End of History philosophy. Therefore Marxists like Perry Anderson have been amongst Fukuyama's fiercest critics. Apart from pointing out some obvious points (that democracies are still riven with poverty, racial tension etc.), Marxists also reject Fukuyama's reliance on Hegel. According to them Hegel's philosophy was fatally flawed until Marx 'turned it on its head' to create the materialist conception of history. Fukuyama rejects these claims completely. He argues that even though there is poverty, racism and sexism in the democracies there is no sign of a major revolutionary movement developing that would actually overthrow capitalism: neither is there any sign of such a movement developing at any point in the future. Fukuyama also argues that communism is an idea whose time has simply come and gone: the failure of the Russian experiment and the economic collapse of countries like North Korea and Cuba shows that communism has no future.
3: There is also the environmentalist challenge. Environmentalists argue that the capitalist economies' propensity towards growth will eventually collide with the earth's natural Limits to Growth. Some radical alteration in the socio-economic situation of the West would then have to take place.
Fukuyama barely discusses these problems, but he would probably agree with Bjřrn Lomborg that the threat is overstated. Moreover, he would probably argue that even if it was true that there were limits to growth, any possible solution could only be found by a society that was, in the broadest sense of the word, democratic, and that still contained markets of some sort.
4: There have been numerous other intellectuals and thinkers who have disagreed with the End of History thesis. For example, Samuel P. Huntington, in his essay and book, "The Clash of Civilizations," argues that the temporary conflict between ideologies is being replaced by the ancient conflict between civilizations. The dominant civilization decides the form of human government, and these will not be constant.
Fukuyama himself later conceded that his thesis was incomplete, but for a different reason: "we hadn't reached the end of history because we hadn't yet reached the end of science" (quoted from front flap of Our Posthuman Future). Fukuyama predicts that humanity's control of its own evolution will have a great and possibly terrible effect on the liberal democracy.
5. Finally there is an argument that is mostly, (if not always) used by those who have not actually read Fukuyama's work. This is that that Fukuyama is arguing that 'American-style' democracy is the only 'correct' political system and that all countries must inevitably become more like the United States. This view is simply false. Fukuyama's argument is purely and simply that in the future there will be more and more governments that use the framework of parliamentary democracy and that contain markets of some sort. Sweden, Venezuela, Turkey, India and Ghana fit this description as well as (or better than) the United States.
Finally, it has been argued that Fukuyama's notion of "The End of History" is merely a Hegelian articulation of the Whig interpretation of history. However, as the latter sections of his book makes clear, Fukuyama is no liberal optimist: instead he is a pessimist influenced by Nietzsche (especially Nietzsche as interpreted by Leo Strauss) who sees the end of history as being ultimately a sad and emotionally unsatisfying era.
Publication history
- Free Press, 1992, hardcover (ISBN 0029109752)
- Perennial Publishing, 1993, paperback (ISBN 0380720027)
See also
ja:歴史の終わり
